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Lakeview Tower: Case History of Foundation Failure 
K. R. Peaker 
Geotechnical Consultant, Trow Ltd. 
SYNOPSIS The 14 storey Lakeview Towers apartment building in Sudbury, Ontario, Canada began with the 
site investigation in 1972 and ended 10 years later by demolition. During this interval settlements 
of over 400 mm occurred in one section of the structure. The reasons for the settlement revolved 
around a change in foundation design from piles to spread footings on improved ground, complicated by 
an unexpected layer of highly compressible clay. While the building may have been able to tolerate 
the settlement depending on the reader's interpretation of the results, it was demolished after 
legal disputes. A final structural analysis indicated a deficiency related particularly to earth-
quake loading. 
In the summer of 1972 the geotechnical con-
sultant was authorized to carry out the site 
investigation for a four storey apartment/ 
commer~ial complex. The building, approxi-
mately 165 m x 25 m was proposed to be 
constructed without basement. The site in-
vestigation consisted of four widely spaced 
holes inside the proposed building area. 
The stratigraphy was found to be relatively 
simple, compact to dense silty sand over 
bedrock at 4.3 to 6.1 m below present ground 
surface. The consultant recommended spread 
footings for this four storey building uti-
lizing a safe net allowable bearing pressure 
of 0.15 MPa for footings 1.5 m below ground 
surface. 
The geology of the North Bay area is well 
known for its erratic bedrock profile and 
glacial sand and clay deposits. At the site 
location the superficial deposit is mapped 
as Wisconsinan aged sand. The grey to brown 
sand and silty sand was deposited below 
water plane as preglacial lake sands. These 
lacustrine deposits are often associated 
with moraines and eskers and commonly show 
repetitious interbedding with silt and clay 
and occasionally grade upward into varved 
clay. The sands are expected to overly red 
and grey noncalcareous silt till and bedrock 
consisting of Precambrian gneiss. Harrison, 
J.E. (1972). 
Soon after the submission of the site inves-
tigation report the building proposed was 
changed to a 14 storey reinforced concrete 
building with brick infill, again without 
basement. The building shape altered con-
siderably and extended beyond the original 
site investigation. Fig. 1. The original 
site investigation was considered to be 
adequate for the 14 storey building as the 
new foundations recommended were piles or 
caissons and little variation in subsoil 
conditions was evident from the four borings. 
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Fig. 1. Building Layout 
Immediately prior to construction in 1973 the 
owner was approached by an international firm 
specializing in ground improvement using vibra-
tion to obtain either increased density and/or 
stone columns to support the load from conven-
tional spread footings. This type of ground 
improvement had not been used in the Province 
of Ontario and the Canadian reference provided 
by the contractor was a single site in Quebec. 
For this type of construction it is not uncommon 
for the owner to act as his own project manager 
and contractor. He will retain the geotechnical 
consultant, the architects, the engineer, and 
will then subcontract each facet of the con-
struction. It was therefore not uncommon for 
the owner to directly engage the foundation con-
tractor. In this case the structural consultant 
and the geotechnical consultant were advised of 
the alternative to the piling proposed and they 
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offered no constructive criticism. The process 
was, after all, virtually unknown in Canada yet 
the contractor specified that "Total or differ-
ential settlements will take place when the 
footings are loaded and will not exceed 12 mm. 
Any settlement after the building is erected 
will be negligible". This contractor further 
stated "Our work is covered by 100% performance 
bond issued upon request and by comprehensive 
general liability including completed opera-
tion". The process was accepted in Europe. 
Greenwood, D.A. (1970). The contractor ex-
plained that he would use vibroflotation down 
to bedrock at an average depth of 5.2 m. 
Since no adverse comments were forthcoming, the 
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ig, 2. Subsoil Improvement Footing A 10 
owner retained the contractor to complete the 
ground improvement and to utilize spread foot-
ings designed with a safe net bearing value of 
0.5 MPa resting on the improved subsoil. The 
soil consultant was also retained to check the 
results to ensure that they were satisfactory. 
In retrospect, no one is certain what the 
foundation contractor intended to do. His 
contract called for 254 compaction points, 
each with a safe working load of 150 kps. 
This would indicate a vibro-replacement system 
yet this contractor stated "We are positive 
that a densification of the subsoil by means 
of the vibroflotation method is feasible", 
possibly inferring a vibro compaction system. 
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The site work to improve the subsoil began 
without delay. The contractor began work in 
the north central section of the site - an 
area that had been covered by the initial 
site investigation. 
To prove that the vibratory subsoil improve-
ment system was adequate, the soil consultant 
elected to use a modified S.P.T. test. This 
test, while empirical, is extensively used in 
the area for estimating safe net bearing 
values, and as the before and after results 
were available for comparison, this was felt 
to be the most rapid and economic approach. 
The procedu&e consists of driving a 50 mm 
















energy used was equivalent to the S.P.T. test, 
i.e. 63.6 kg hammer dropping 0.76 m. This 
procedure, defined locally as a dynamic cone 
test, has the disadvantage of friction build-up 
along the rods. Fig. 2 summarizes the results 
for footing A 10. 
The foundation contractor elected to improve 
the subsoil in the area of the larger footings 
(approx. 2.1 m x 2.1 m) using five "compaction 
points", one at each corner and one in the 
centre. For smaller footings (approx. 1.2 m 
x 1.2 m) two compaction points were to be 
used. The compaction points were in fact stone 
columns formed using 15 mm clear stone. 
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On evaluation of the test results, the soil 
consultant accepted the procedure of five com-
paction points for the larger footings despite 
the problem of compaction in the upper region 
of low confining pressure, but rejected the 
two compaction point procedure for the small 
footings. Fig. 3 shows the original results 
of inadequate compaction for footing B 16. 
The contractor agreed to increase to four com-
paction points for these footings and the soil 
consultant withdrew from the site. 
No accurate records are available for the work 
carried out by the foundation contractor. 
Whether electrical input measurements control-
led the vibration; whether the wet or dry pro-
cedure was used; what quantities of stone were 
used, or in fact the actual depth of the soil 
improvement, is not known. 
The first public indication of a settlement 
problem was documented by the site meeting on 
August 21, 1973, some three months after com-
pletion of the foundation and site improvement 
and when the building was at approximately the 
10 storey construction level. At this time, 
settlement measurements taken as a routine pro-
cedure, indicated movements of 70 mm over a 
one month period (measuring point No. 1). The 
foundation contractor, soils consultant, 
structural designer and builder (owner) were 
advised of hairline cracks occurring in the 
area along line L between lines 7 and 3. A 
program of measurements on columns was set out 
as well as additional soil investigation in 
the problem area. "The masonry on the remain-
ing floors is to proceed on schedule in order 
to achieve maximum loading". 
At this time in the building's history, i.e. 
s 
!98.0 
July, 1973, it can be asked "Why did construc-
tion continue if significant settlements were 
observed and a change in soil conditions was 
suspected?". This question cannot be answered 
but some of the factors leading to the decis-
ion on July 20, 1973 to continue were: that 
the building was nearing completion, i.e. at 
approximately the 10 storey level with nearly 
70% of the dead load in place; no significant 
cracking could be found in the building althOU! 
minor cracking as reported was observed. 
Economic pressures dictate as short as possibl! 
construction cycle; publicity would not be 
beneficial. The condition of the building and 
the settlement observations taken over the fol· 
lowing few weeks indicated to the geotechnical 
engineer that despite the increased loads th~ 
settlement was reducing. Certainly all part1e 
at the meeting agreed construction should pro-
ceed. 
The additional soil investigation indicated a 
layer of soft clay reaching a maximum thicknes 
of 2.8 m near measuring point No. 2, with zero 
thickness near point No.4 (Fig. 1). This cla. 
layer was described as soft grey silty clay 
having increased silt content with depth. 
Laboratory test results for the clay layer gav 
values of approximately 71 to 76% for moisture 
content; 71 to 72% for liquid limit; 22 to 
25% for plastic limit; 15.6 kN/m3 unit weight 
Undrained triaxial compression tests placed th 
shear strength in the 16 to 19 kPa range. Con 
solidation tests carried out in the oedometer 
indicated the preconsolidation pressure at the 
overburden pressure. 
The subsoil stratigraphy for the site was now 
accurately known and is shown as Fig. 4. 
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Settlement measurements were undertaken by a 
registered land surveyor using 6 points estab-
lished on the building. The readings had begun 
July 20, 1973 and were continued until May 197~ 
During this period the points were moved from 
inside to outside the building explaining some 
of the curves, and several points were lost for 
a few months. The bench marks used for the 
survey were the original intended only for 
construction control. A brief study of one of 
these reference points indicated movements of 
1.5 mm. The movements of the bench mark are 
not uncommon in this area and can be attributed 
to the movement of frost into and out of the 
ground. 
The settlement of the building as recorded over 
the 3 year period is shown in detail on Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 5. Settlement Records 
If it is possible to construct a settlement 
contour from six points, Fig. 6 provides a 
reasonable proposal. It is of interest to 
note that the settlement began virtually as 
construction commenced, hence the lower por-
tion of the building settled significantly 
more than the roof. Fig. 7 provides an indica-
tion of the settlement for the roof and second 
floor. These three Figures, 5, 6 and 7, sum-
marize the performance of the building. Table 
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Fig. 6. Contour Drawing of Building Settlement 
Fig. 7. Settlement of Second Floor and Roof 
Around Building Perimeter 
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TABLE I. Maximum Settlement vs Depth of Clay 
Settlement (mm) (m) 
Point Maximum Roof Depth 
Settlement Settlement of Clay 
1 412 244 2.8 
2 421 274 2.8 
3 113 61 2.2 
4 30 0 0.0 
5 180 91 0.8 
6 204 152 0.8 
It is worth noting that for all settlement 
measurements the actual total settlement is un-
known . The curves shown on Fig. 5 have been 
projected/calculated in reverse from the date 
of the first measurement, i.e. July 20, 1973 to 
the beginning of construction of spread foot-
ings on April 20, 1973. The settlement picture 
is complicated by the fact that 1.2 to 1.8 m of 
sand fill was placed in the building area in 
May or June of 1973. This fill accelerated the 
settlement in the early stages. 
The building was occupied by early 1974 and the 
owner/builder stopped taking settlement read-
ings by May 1, 1974. The soil consultant con-
tinued having the readings taken until May, 
1977. 
Until the completion of the building and its 
occupation, the relationship between owner/ 
builder, architect, engineer, and geotechnical 
consultant, was excellent. Close co-operation 
with all parties had enabled the building to 
be completed on time and without major prob-
lems related to the settlement. Careful 
observation of all portions of the building, 
plus the continued monitoring of the settle-
ment, provided confidence to all the respon-
sible parties that the building was and would 
continue to be satisfactory. 
During February 1975 the owner proceeded with 
a court order against "all" parties claiming 
damages. From this point until the end of 
the building's life, scores of experts were 
involved in analysis, investigation, appraisal, 
etc. The final order to evacuate the building 
came on Janua.ry 5, 1978 when the North Bay 
building inspector ordered evacuation. A 
dramatic ending took just 7 seconds on July 4, 
1982 when Greenspoon Bros. Limited utilized 
the implosion principal to level the building. 
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9. 
Before reviewing the actual verdict that 
~aused the demise, some brief comments relat-
d to the settlement and the causes are in 
"der. 
•. 6 indicates a best guess at the settle-
t contours for the building. As drawn they 
' a uniform change in settlement across the 
ding. Based on crude estimates, this pro-
s just over 300 mm of settlement across 
43 m of structure. 
Fig. 8. Building Just Prior to Demolition 
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Fig. 9. Building Just After Demolition 
When compared wHh values of Bjerrum, L. (1963) 
this does not seem alarming. This interpreta -
tion of the settlement helps to clarify the 
condition of the building -which remained ex-
cellent with little sign of major distress. 
Those with a keen eye reportedly could detect 
a lean to the south wall, this visual percep-
tion when related to the work of Skempton, A.W. 
and MacDonald, D.H. (1956) tends to confirm 
their findings if we assume a building approxi· 
mately 45 m in height. 
What was the effect of the site improvement? 
The foundation contractor had specified 
"points" taken to bedrock. If these points 
were in fact stone columns (and later review 
shows this contractor used 200 tonnes of stone 
in the vibratory process), it is possible to 
estimate that the settlement would not have 
been as great as measured. In fact, had the 
spread footings been placed in the sand with-
out the improvement, the settlement would have 
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been of less magnitude. It can be postulated 
that the foundation contractor utilized a mix-
ture of vibro compaction and vibro replacement 
to increase the density of the soil. In doing 
so. little regard was placed on what was happen-
ing to the ground. It is probable that the 
vibratory probe caused considerable disturbance 
to the silty clay without constructing a suit-
able stone column. Why the contractor failed 
to advise anyone that the probe depths had in-
creased well beyond the average of 5.2 m given 
in his contract is a mystery. One of the re-
tained experts stated "It is surely not too 
much to expect that this subcontractor should 
have noticed the wide divergence from the anti-
cipated conditions during his performance of 
the work". 
The clay layer was without doubt the culprit 
in the case. The thickness of this layer, as 
indicated in Table I, is significant so why 
was it not encountered in the original site 
investigation? In the area of the original 
boreholes the depth to bedrock (refusal) was 
4.3 m for two of the holes and in these areas 
no clay of significance is noted. The other 
two of the original boreholes went to 5.8 and 
6.1 m depth but no samples were recovered from 
the lowest level - they were lost. Since the 
original design called for lightly loaded 
spread footings near ground surface and the 
modified 14 storey foundation was specified as 
piles, presumably the consultant felt this 
sample loss was not of a major importance. 
If it is assumed that some form of stone column 
of inadequate construction and depth was left 
by the foundation contractor, it is easy to en-
visage a load transfer to these columns and 
overstressing of the lower clay layer. The 
overstressed clay could be expected to react in 
a manner similar to the load settlement curves 
in Fig. 5. This should not be assumed to be 
the simple solution. Many experts spent many 
dollars calculating, adjusting, factoring and 
plotting to get conventional elastic consolida-
tion theory to fit these curves. 
In the end the claim against all parties invol-
ved in the construction triggered not only geo-
technical investigations but also structural 
re-analysis. This structural re-analysis show-
ed that no allowance had been made for earth-
quake forces. This consideration was specified 
in a 1970 building code and its absence, when 
combined with the settlement problem and other 
problems that arose during close scrutiny, re-
sulted in the end of the building. 
From a geotechnical consideration had the 
building been saved? People had occupied the 
building for 3 years. Maintenance was not a 
significant problem. Fig. 5 indicates the per-
formance. Could it be said that the operation 
was a success but the patient died? 
To individually acknowledge all of the person-
nel involved would be difficult and possibly 
not desirable. At least let it be known that 
the work was essentially done by many contribu-
tors from several countries. 
13 
CONCLUSION 
A settlement problem resulted from an inade-
quate site investigation combined with the 
vibroflotation process. Careful site measure-
ment of the settlement provided confidence that 
the building was safe. Litigation revealed 
other problems that combined with the settle-
ment problem to cause the demolition of a 14 
storey building. 
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